Interview with German Major General Christian Freuding On the Situation In Ukraine
The head of the Ukraine Special Staff in the Federal Ministry of Defense, Major General Christian Freuding, expects further escalation of fighting in the Ukraine war in the coming weeks. ‘We must anticipate that the Russian armed forces will attempt to increase the intensity of their combat operations again before the designated US President Donald Trump takes office on January 20,’ Freuding said in an interview with Handelsblatt, 2024-12-02
If, for example, the important logistics hub Pokrovsk falls, the Russian attackers could easily advance further westward because prepared defensive positions are lacking, and the terrain makes defense difficult, the officer explained. The Russian army is like a bucket-wheel excavator ‘digging through an open-pit mine. Slow at first, now faster.’
It must be expected that Russia can indeed continue the war at its current intensity. The country is spending between eight and ten percent of its economic output on defense.
‘And its war economy produces more weapons, ammunition, and military goods in three months than European states do in a year.’ Therefore, it is assumed that Moscow is aiming to make the Russian army so powerful that in five to eight years, it could even have the potential to attack a NATO state, Freuding said.”
General, how do you assess the military situation in Ukraine?
From the perspective of the Ukrainian armed forces, the military situation is currently tense. The Russian army has been advancing for months and is achieving significantly greater territorial gains in central Donbas than it did a few months ago or last year. South of the city of Pokrovsk, there is a risk that Ukrainian troops could be encircled.
What does that mean?
The Ukrainian high command must strategically withdraw troops to straighten the front, which requires giving up territory to preserve their forces and better coordinate operations. As a result, the Ukrainian logistics hub of Pokrovsk is coming under massive pressure because it is now within range of Russian artillery. However, I do not expect the Russians to attempt to capture Pokrovsk through urban warfare.
Instead?
They will try to cut the city off from its lifelines first and then, as with Bakhmut, Avdiivka, or Mariupol, reduce it to rubble. This would open up the area for Russian forces to advance westward. Based on our knowledge, there are neither prepared defensive positions nor favorable terrain for defense until the border of the oblast. Additionally, the only coal mine still operating in the region could be lost.
Is a collapse of the front imminent?
I don’t see that happening at the moment. Figuratively speaking, we can compare the Russian army to a large bucket-wheel excavator digging through an open-pit mine—slow at first, but now faster.
What about the Ukrainian offensive in the Russian region of Kursk?
The Ukrainians are currently holding their ground but are also under massive pressure there and have had to relinquish territory they previously captured. Russia has now concentrated 50,000 to 60,000 troops in Kursk and is relentlessly attacking with artillery and air force support.
Was the offensive a mistake because it came at the expense of defending Donbas?
That is a question military historians will have to answer someday. The offensive aimed for a psychological effect, both internally for the Ukrainian population and externally, to demonstrate Russia’s vulnerability and show the Western international community that military aid is making a difference. Additionally, Ukraine was able to capture many soldiers and weaken Russian troops preparing for deployment in Ukraine.
North Korean troops are also deployed in the Kursk region. Does this signify a strong Russia that can rely on international partners, or a weak Russia that depends on external help?
Both. Militarily, the deployment of North Koreans will neither qualitatively nor quantitatively influence the course of the war. The Russian army loses well over 1,500 men daily, so you can calculate what 10,000 North Korean soldiers can achieve. On top of that, there are equipment shortages, lack of combat experience, and language barriers. However, it is, of course, a political escalation if Putin manages to draw a partner from another world region into the war.
Can Ukraine still manage to mobilize enough soldiers?
Of course, it becomes more challenging in the third year of the war. In the spring, the mobilization age was lowered to 25, which led to a very positive development in recruitment numbers. However, it remains a challenge—and social cohesion is of great importance for the course of the war.
The German government itself is training Ukrainians on a large scale. Are you noticing a decline in morale?
Morale, patriotism, and courage remain unbroken. However, we now see fewer perfectly trained artillery specialists who only need instruction on the Panzerhaubitze 2000. Instead, there are more reservists and older recruits without prior qualifications.
Can you fully utilize the training capacities offered by the Bundeswehr?
Not entirely. We can’t always fill every course completely, but we achieve a high rate of 85 to 90 percent. We regularly renegotiate with Ukraine how long soldiers can be spared from the front for training purposes.
Given the high losses, is it expected that Russia’s offensive drive will diminish?
Recruitment in Russia is functioning—through a perfidious system of incentives and coercion. Incentives include extremely high pay or benefits like property acquisition opportunities or access to universities. At the same time, regional governors are judged by how many soldiers they can provide to the army. In an autocratic system, we can imagine the kinds of methods being employed.
So you don’t expect the fighting to ease in winter?
No, quite the opposite. We must expect that the Russian armed forces will try to further intensify their combat operations before the designated US President Donald Trump takes office on January 20.
What do you expect from the future US government and the designated American Ukraine Special Envoy Keith Kellogg?
This is all speculation until the new US administration takes office. However, we know that the Ukrainians are making significant efforts to align closely with the incoming US administration even now.
Is the West currently doing everything possible to change the course of the war before Trump takes office? Is the clearance to use ATACMS missiles on Russian territory an indication of that?
The US is attempting to implement the clear support policies of Joe Biden’s administration with all its strength and determination. This includes the ATACMS as well as near-daily material deliveries.
Does the clearance for these long-range weapons signify a different level of Western involvement?
No single weapon system is a “gamechanger” by itself. What matters is the ability to deploy various systems in a coordinated way. ATACMS expand the toolbox, nothing more.
What about Russia’s material sustainability in the war?
Russia is spending between eight and ten percent of its economic output on defense, and its war economy produces more weapons, ammunition, and military equipment in three months than European states do in a year. Production exceeds what is consumed at the front, with part of it going into stockpiles. Therefore, we must anticipate that Russia can continue the war at this level of intensity.
So the Russian army has not been significantly weakened by almost three years of war?
We do not observe that—quite the opposite. We believe Moscow is aiming to make the Russian army so powerful that in five to eight years, it could even have the potential to attack a NATO state.
How can the Bundeswehr continue to support Ukraine? Do the depots still have resources available?
The possibilities of providing equipment from active stock are nearly exhausted, although we are still trying to deliver missing spare parts, for example. We are even dismantling old ammunition past its expiration date into individual components and providing it to Ukraine as raw materials. Primarily, however, we are ordering weapons and materials from the industry, which has the side effect of increasing their production capacities. Additionally, we aim to help Ukraine strengthen its domestic defense industry.
How so?
According to their own statements, Ukraine’s defense industry currently has unused production capacities worth around ten billion euros. This means the companies could produce more if they had the budget for it. We aim to facilitate procurement and cover part of the costs.
If the US were to significantly reduce or cease its engagement in Ukraine, would Europe also have to scale back?
No. The EU has 27 economically strong member states. Alongside the US, there are 31 NATO partners and the Ramstein-format support group, which includes countries like Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. Together, we have the capacity to fill the gap that any one partner might leave. What we need is the political and societal will to do so.
But if Europe produces fewer arms in a year than Russia does in three months, that will be difficult.
We need higher defense budgets across Europe in general and better defense cooperation, for example, through the new EU Defense Commissioner. This will allow production capacities to grow and budgets to be used more efficiently. In the area of air defense systems and associated missiles, we have, in part due to support for Ukraine, doubled or even tripled production capacities in recent years.
There are voices from Poland saying, “If Ukraine is at risk of losing, we’d rather send our own troops so that Russia doesn’t eventually reach the Polish border.” Do you think the debate about deploying European ground troops could gain traction again?
That is not an issue for us. There are also repeated calls to train Ukrainian soldiers in Ukraine instead. However, I don’t see any military argument in favor of that. We have far better conditions for training in Germany.
Namely?
Among other things, we would likely have to take in a large number of Ukrainians who would leave their homeland to live in freedom. Of course, supporting Ukraine requires significant effort. But the cost of upholding principles is always lower than the price of capitulation. It is the price of freedom.
This message doesn’t seem to resonate with all citizens.
We are a liberal democracy, so there will naturally be differing opinions. In the coming weeks and months, we must articulate even more strongly what it means to stand up for liberal democracy and what it looks like when freedom is lost. You can see this in the Russian-occupied areas of Donbas, for example.
Would Ukraine, in your opinion, accept territorial concessions in exchange for peace?
Ukraine’s goal remains unchanged: to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and that is also in our interest. However, I interpret recent statements by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as an acknowledgment that achieving this in the near term is unlikely through military means alone. Instead, it will require a phase of diplomacy and negotiations.
Would European troops need to secure peace along the demarcation line in the event of a ceasefire?
That’s something we cannot foresee at this moment. The first step would be to open a window of opportunity to achieve a ceasefire in the first place. How it could then be structured and secured—those are questions that, unfortunately, remain far off for now.
